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Abstract
We prove that every transferable utility (TU) game can be generated by a coali-
tion production economy. Given a TU game, the set of Walrasian payoff vectors of
the induced coalition production economy coincides with the core of the balanced
cover of the given game. Therefore, a Walrasian equilibrium for the induced coali-
tion production economy always exists. The induced coalition production economy
has one output and the same number of inputs as agents. Every input is personal-
ized and it can be interpreted as agent’s labor. In a Walrasian equilibrium, every
agent is permitted to work at several firms. In a Walrasian equilibrium without
double-jobbing, in contrast, every agent has to work at exactly one firm. This re-
stricted concept of a Walrasian equilibrium enables us to discuss which coalitions
are formed in an equilibrium. If the cohesive cover or the completion of a given TU
game is balanced, then the no-double-jobbing restriction does not matter, i.e., there
exists no difference between Walrasian payoff vectors and Walrasian payoff vectors
without double-jobbing.
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1 Introduction
A transferable utility (TU) game is a reduced form in the sense that it is derived from
models with richer structure such as exchange economies or strategic coalitional games.
Shapley and Shubik [18] proved that the class of totally balanced TU games coincides
with the class of TU games generated by exchange economies. In an exchange economy,
an allocation feasible in disjoint segmented markets is also feasible in the union of those
markets. The total balancedness is a more general concept than this superadditivity.
In a coalition production economy, however, different coalitions can access to different
production sets and, therefore, a feasible allocation in segmented markets need not be
feasible in the union of those markets any longer. A simple example is an economy with
decreasing returns to scale in production. As a result, a coalition production economy can
generate a TU game which is not even superadditive. On the other hand, an exchange
economy is a special case of a coalition production economy. Hence, the class of TU
games generated by coalition production economies must be larger than the class of totally
balanced TU games, the class generated by exchange economies. Our first result says that
TU games generated by coalition production economies fill up the class of all TU games.
Thus, any TU game can be generated by a coalition production economy.
Given a TU game, we induce two coalition production economies generating the game.
The first one is due to Sun et al. [20]. The second one is a slight modification of the
first one and it is related to Billera’s [2] representation of totally balanced non-transferable
utility (NTU) games. Both induced economies consist of one output and the same number
of inputs as agents. Every input is personalized and it can be interpreted as agents’ labor.
All agents have the same consumption set and the same simple utility function, where
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the utility is the amount of consumption of the output. The consumption set and the
utility function do not depend on a given TU game. Accordingly, the difference among
TU games is represented only by coalitions’ production sets. Our two induced economies
have the different description of production sets. In the first induced economy, agents’
labor is complementary, but in the second induced economy, agents working at the same
firm are required to invest their labor in the same proportion. A unique way not to waste
agents’ labor in the first induced economy is that agents in the same coalition work in
the same proportion like the second induced economy. Thus, the difference between two
economies is small; actually, they give the same set of Walrasian payoff vectors. It should
be emphasized that our second induced economy describes the situation where if all agents
in coalition S invest the same units λ of their labor, then they earn in total λv(S) units
of the output, where v(S) is the worth of coalition S. Recall that this story is used as
an interpretation of the worth v(S). Hence, our second induced economy describes this
situation explicitly inside a model.
Once we obtain a coalition production economy generating a given TU game, a ques-
tion of the relationship between the core and Walrasian equilibria is raised. It is known
that in an exchange economy with infinitely many agents, the set of core allocations co-
incides with the set of Walrasian allocations (see Debreu and Scarf [7] and Aumann [1]).
The current question is slightly different. We start with a TU game rather than an econ-
omy, and we compare the core of the TU game and the set of Walrasian payoff vectors of
the induced coalition production economy.
Since inputs are agents’ labor in our induced coalition production economies, we can
define two kinds of Walrasian equilibrium. In just a Walrasian equilibrium, agents are
allowed to work at several firms. In a Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing, in
contrast, agents have to work at exactly one firm. The concept of Walrasian equilibrium
without double-jobbing was considered by Sun et al. [20] to discuss which coalitions are
formed in an equilibrium. A coalition is formed if all agents in the coalition work at
the firm corresponding to the coalition. Our two induced economies give the same set of
Walrasian payoff vectors regardless of whether the double-jobbing is allowed or not, but
3
the coalition structure in a Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing can be different
between two induced economies. The coalition structure in an equilibrium of our second
induced economy is always a partition of the set of agents, but the coalition structure of
our first induced economy due to Sun et al. [20] need not be a partition. This point was
missed by Sun et al. [20].
Regarding a Walrasian equilibrium, we prove that the set of Walrasian payoff vectors
of our representation coincides with the core of the balanced cover of the given TU game.
Therefore, by virtue of Bondareva-Shapley theorem (see Bondareva [5] and Shapley [17]),
our induced coalition production economies always have Walrasian equilibrium. The
reason why the set of Walrasian payoff vectors coincides not with the core itself but with
the core of the balanced cover is as follows. If the production set for the grand coalition
is not efficient, then agents work at smaller coalitions’ firms and they can produce more
output. By working at each coalition’s firm for the same ratio as the balancing weight,
agents can achieve the worth of the balanced cover.
In our equivalence between Walrasian payoff vectors and the core, every core element
is an input price vector in the corresponding Walrasian equilibrium. This property is not
inherent in our coalition production economy. Shapley and Shubik’s [19] equivalence and
Qin’s [13] equivalence discussed later also have the relationship between core elements
and equilibrium price vectors.
Since the core of the balanced cover is equal to the core of the totally balanced cover,
our equivalence has the connection with Shapley and Shubik’s [19] equivalence and the
TU version of Qin’s [13] equivalence. Shapley and Shubik [19] proved that given a to-
tally balanced TU game, its core coincides with Walrasian payoff vectors of their induced
exchange economy. Qin [13] proved the equivalence between the inner core of a given to-
tally balanced NTU game and Walrasian payoff vectors of Billera’s [2] induced production
economy. Since the inner core is equal to the core in the framework of TU games, by Qin’s
theorem, the core of a totally balanced TU game coincides with Walrasian payoff vectors
of the TU version of Billera’s representation. Together with these known results, the set
of Walrasian payoff vectors of our representations, the set of Walrasian payoff vectors of
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Shapley and Shubik’s [18] representation of the totally balanced cover of the given TU
game, and the set of Walrasian payoff vectors of Billera’s [2] representation of the totally
balanced cover of the given TU game are all the same.
A similar result holds for Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing. Sun et al.
[20] induced a coalition production economy from the completion of a TU game and proved
the equivalence between the core of the completion and the set of Walrasian payoff vectors
without double-jobbing. The completion is the TU game in which the worth of the grand
coalition is enlarged to hold the superadditivity with respect to the grand coalition. We
generalize the result by Sun et al. [20]. The set of Walrasian payoff vectors without
double-jobbing of the given TU game coincides with the set of Walrasian payoff vectors
without double-jobbing of the completion, and this common set also coincides with the
core of the completion. If the completion of a given TU game is balanced, then the
no-double-jobbing restriction does not matter, i.e., the set of Walrasian payoff vectors
coincides with the set of Walrasian payoff vectors without double-jobbing in our induced
coalition production economies.
1.1 Outline of the paper
In Section 2, we give the description of TU games and coalition production economies.
Also, we generate a TU game from a coalition production economy.
In Section 3, we give two induced coalition production economies and prove that
they actually generate the original TU game (Theorem 1). The second induced economy
has a connection with Billera’s [2] representation of totally balanced NTU games. The
connection will be clarified in Section 4.3. Theorem 2 says that every TU game can be
generated by a coalition production economy.
In Section 4, we consider a Walrasian equilibrium for our induced economies. In
Section 4.1, we give its precise definition (Definition 1). Theorem 3 says that our two
induced economies give the same set of Walrasian payoff vectors. In Section 4.2, we review
the concepts related to the core: balancedness, balanced cover, totally balanced cover,
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and Bondareva-Shapley theorem. In Section 4.3, we summarize Billera’s [2] representation
of totally balanced TU games (Theorem 4). Theorem 5 is the TU version of Qin’s [13]
theorem, which says that for a totally balanced TU game, its core coincides with the
set of Walrasian payoff vectors of Billera’s induced production economy. In Section 4.4,
we summarize Shapley and Shubik’s [18] representation of totally balanced TU games
(Theorem 6). Theorem 7 due to Shapley and Shubik [19, Theorem 1] says that for a totally
balanced TU game, its core coincides with the set of Walrasian payoff vectors of Shapley
and Shubik’s [18] induced exchange economy. In Section 4.5, in Theorem 8, we clarify
the relationship between the core and the set of Walrasian payoff vectors of our induced
coalition production economy and also clarify the relationship with Qin’s equivalence
theorem (Theorem 5) and Shapley and Shubik’s equivalence theorem (Theorem 7).
In Section 5, we consider a Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing for our
induced economies. Thus, we bring the indivisibility restriction of no-double-jobbing into
the model analyzed in Section 4. In Section 5.1, we give the precise definition (Definition
4) of a Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing and discuss the coalition structure.
Proposition 1 says that the coalition structure of our second induced economy is always a
partition of the set of agents. On the other hand, Example 1 points out that the coalition
structure of our first induced economy need not be a partition. Here, a difference between
our two representations is clarified. However, our two induced economies give the same
set of Walrasian payoff vectors without double-jobbing (Theorem 9). In Section 5.2, we
review some concepts of a TU game: cohesive cover, completion, and superadditive cover.
In Section 5.3, in Theorem 10, we clarify the relationship between the core and the set
of Walrasian payoff vectors without double-jobbing of our induced economy. Theorem
11 says that if the cohesive cover or the completion of a given TU game is balanced,
then the set of Walrasian payoff vectors without double-jobbing coincides with the set of
Walrasian payoff vectors and, thus, the indivisibility restriction of no-double-jobbing does
not matter.
In Section 6, we give some remarks concerning the extension of our results to NTU
games.
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2 TU games and coalition production economies
We begin with some notation. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set with n elements and let RN
be the n-dimensional Euclidean space of vectors x with coordinates xi indexed by i ∈ N .
For a nonempty subset S of N , let RS = {x ∈ RN |xi = 0 for every i ∈ N \ S}, let
RS+ = {x ∈ RS |xi ≥ 0 for every i ∈ S}, and let e(S) ∈ RN be the characteristic vector of
S, i.e., e(S)i = 1 if i ∈ S and 0 otherwise. We write e(i) instead of e({i}). For x ∈ RN ,
x(S) denotes the projection of x on RS. The symbol 0 denotes the origin in RN as well
as the real number zero.
Let N be the family of all nonempty subsets of N , i.e., N = {S ⊆ N |S 6= ∅}.
Elements in N are called coalitions. A transferable utility game (TU game, for short) with
n players is a real-valued function on N . A typical TU game is denoted by v : N → R.
A coalition production economy with n agents is a collection of the commodity space
RL, where L is the set of commodities, agents’ characteristics (X i, ui, ωi)i∈N , and coali-
tions’ production sets (Y S)S∈N satisfying the following conditions. For every agent i ∈ N ,
consumption set X i ⊆ RL is nonempty, closed, convex, and bounded from below; utility
function ui : X i → R is continuous and concave; endowment vector ωi is in RL. For every
coalition S ∈ N , its production set Y S ⊆ RL is nonempty, closed, convex, and satisfies
Y S ∩RL+ = {0} and
(∑
i∈S X
i
)∩({∑i∈S ωi}+ Y S) 6= ∅. A coalition production economy
is denoted by E = (RL, (X i, ui, ωi)i∈N , (Y S)S∈N ).
An exchange economy is a coalition production economy with Y S = {0} for every
S ∈ N . Shapley and Shubik [18] characterized the class of totally balanced TU games
by exchange economies (see Section 4.4). Another special case of a coalition production
economy is a production economy where every agent i has his own production set Y i.
In this case, coalition S’s production set Y S is given by Y S =
∑
i∈S Y
i. Billera [2]
characterized the class of totally balanced non-transferable utility (NTU) games by this
type of production economies (see Section 4.3).
For every coalition S ∈ N , FE(S) denotes the set of feasible S-allocations for a coalition
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production economy E , i.e.,
FE(S) =
{
(xi)i∈S
∣∣∣∣∣xi ∈ X i for every i ∈ S and ∑
i∈S
(xi − ωi) ∈ Y S
}
.
Note that, for every S ∈ N , FE(S) is nonempty, compact, and convex.1 Any coalition
production economy E naturally generates a TU game vE : N → R by defining
vE(S) = max
{∑
i∈S
ui(xi)
∣∣∣∣∣ (xi)i∈S ∈ FE(S)
}
for every S ∈ N .
3 Representation of TU games
We prove that every TU game can be generated by a coalition production economy.
The next lemma enables us to restrict our attention to nonnegative TU games. It is an
extension of Shapley and Shubik [18, Theorem 2] to the class of TU games generated by
coalition production economies.
Lemma 1. Let v : N → R be a TU game generated by a coalition production economy.
Let λ ∈ R+ and c ∈ RN . Then, TU game λv + c defined by
(λv + c)(S) = λv(S) +
∑
i∈S
ci for every S ∈ N
is also a TU game generated by a coalition production economy.
Proof. Let (RL, (X i, ui, ωi)i∈N , (Y S)S∈N ) be a coalition production economy generating v.
For every agent i ∈ N , define u¯i : X i → R by u¯i(x) = λui(x) + ci. It can be easily shown
that the coalition production economy (RL, (X i, u¯i, ωi)i∈N , (Y S)S∈N ) generates λv+c.
Given a TU game, we induce two coalition production economies. The first one is
essentially the same as the induced coalition production economy due to Sun et al. [20].2
1For the boundedness of FE(S), see Debreu [6, Theorem (2), p.77].
2In the induced coalition production economy due to Sun et al. [20], every agent gets utility from
his personalized output commodity. This is not essential and, in our first induced coalition production
economy, every agent gets utility from the unique output commodity. Consequently, the number of
commodities is reduced from 2n to n + 1.
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They constructed a coalition production economy from the completion of a TU game.3
As we will see below, their construction can be applied to any nonnegative TU game and
its generating TU game is equal to the original TU game. The second induced coalition
production economy is a slight modification of the first one and it is also related to the
production economy induced from an NTU game due to Billera [2] (see Section 4.3).
Let v : N → R+. We denote by E1(v) and E2(v) two coalition production economies
induced by v. They have differences only in production sets and the given game v affects
only production sets. For h ∈ {1, 2}, define Eh(v) = (RN ×R, (X i, ui, ωi)i∈N , (Y Sh (v))S∈N )
by for every i ∈ N , X i = {0} × R+ ⊆ RN × R, ui : X i → R is defined by ui(0, x) = x,
ωi = (e(i), 0) ∈ RN × R; for every S ∈ N ,
Y S1 (v) =
{
(y, z) ∈ RN × R
∣∣∣∣ y ∈ −RS+, 0 ≤ z ≤ v(S) minj∈S |yj|
}
and
Y S2 (v) =
{
λ(−e(S), z) ∈ RN × R ∣∣ λ ∈ R+, 0 ≤ z ≤ v(S)} .
Note that, for every S ∈ N , both Y S1 (v) and Y S2 (v) are closed convex cones with vertex
(0, 0) and satisfy
Y Sh (v) ∩
(
RN+ × R+
)
= {(0, 0)} for h = 1, 2.
Hence, E1(v) and E2(v) satisfy all the requirements for a coalition production economy.
In both coalition production economies, every agent has the same consumption set and
the same utility function which do not depend on TU games. Agents are distinguished only
by their endowment vectors. From the form of production sets, the first n commodities
are inputs and the last commodity is an output. Since the ith input is initially owned
only by agent i, input i can be interpreted as agent i’s labor. For firm S to produce the
output, economy E2(v) requires that all agents in S invest their labor to firm S in the
same proportion of their labor. Economy E1(v) does not require the same proportion, but
agents’ labor is complementary. Therefore, a unique way not to waste agents’ labor is that
all agents in a coalition invest their labor in the same proportion like production sets of
3The definition of the completion of a TU game will be given in Section 5.2.
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E2(v). The relation of production sets between economies E1(v) and E2(v) is summarized
in the next lemma.
Lemma 2. Let v : N → R+ and let S ∈ N .
(i) Y S2 (v) ⊆ Y S1 (v).
(ii) If (y, z) ∈ Y S1 (v), then (y, z) ≤ (−minj∈S |yj| e(S), z) ∈ Y S2 (v).
This lemma can be shown straightforwardly. The next theorem says that the TU
games generated by economies E1(v) and E2(v) are equal to the original nonnegative game
v.
Theorem 1. Let v : N → R+. Then, v = vE1(v) = vE2(v).
Proof. Let v : N → R+. Since Y S2 (v) ⊆ Y S1 (v) for every S ∈ N by Lemma 2 (i), we have
FE2(v)(S) ⊆ FE1(v)(S) and, therefore, vE2(v)(S) ≤ vE1(v)(S). Hence, it is enough to prove
the inequalities vE1(v) ≤ v ≤ vE2(v).4
We first prove that vE1(v) ≤ v. Let S ∈ N . By the definition of vE1(v), there exists
(0, xi)i∈S ∈ FE1(v)(S) such that
vE1(v)(S) =
∑
i∈S
ui(0, xi) =
∑
i∈S
xi.
Since (0, xi)i∈S ∈ FE1(v)(S), there exists (y, z) ∈ Y S1 (v) such that
(y, z) =
∑
i∈S
(
(0, xi)− ωi) = (−e(S),∑
i∈S
xi
)
.
Hence, we have
vE1(v)(S) =
∑
i∈S
xi = z ≤ v(S) min
j∈S
|yj| = v(S).
We next prove that v ≤ vE2(v). Let S ∈ N . For every i ∈ S, define (0, xi) ∈ X i by
xi = v(S)/|S|. Since
∑
i∈S
(
(0, xi)− ωi) = (−e(S),∑
i∈S
xi
)
= (−e(S), v(S)) ∈ Y S2 (v),
4For TU games v, w : N → R, the inequality v ≤ w stands for v(S) ≤ w(S) for every S ∈ N .
10
we have (0, xi)i∈S ∈ FE2(v)(S). Therefore,
vE2(v)(S) ≥
∑
i∈S
ui(0, xi) =
∑
i∈S
xi = v(S).
Theorem 2. Every TU game v : N → R can be generated by a coalition production
economy.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 1 and Theorem 1.
4 Walrasian equilibrium
4.1 Walrasian equilibrium for our induced coalition production
economies
We consider a Walrasian equilibrium for economies E1(v) and E2(v). In both economies,
every production set is a cone. Therefore, any firm earns zero profit in a Walrasian
equilibrium. Thus, we do not have to care about the problem of how to distribute the
profits by firms to agents. Furthermore, in both economies E1(v) and E2(v), agents can
transfer utilities through production; let u ∈ RS be a utility allocation of agents in
coalition S. For every t ∈ RS with ∑i∈S ti = 0, since (−e(S),∑i∈S ti) ∈ Y S1 (v) ∩ Y S2 (v),
a utility allocation u+ t can be achieved through production. Therefore, we do not have
to consider the presence of a commodity for transferable utility implicitly.5
We adopt the following equilibrium concept in our coalition production economies
E1(v) and E2(v).
Definition 1. A tuple ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆS, zˆS)S∈N ) of a price vector (qˆ, pˆ) ∈ RN × R,
agents’ consumption vectors (0, xˆi)i∈N , and coalitions’ production vectors (yˆS, zˆS)S∈N is
a Walrasian equilibrium for Eh(v) (h = 1 or 2) if
5This is a difference between our representation and Shapley and Shubik’s [18] representation. See
Section 4.4.
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(1) (qˆ, pˆ) ∈ RN+ × R+;
(2) for every S ∈ N , (yˆS, zˆS) ∈ Y Sh (v) and
(qˆ, pˆ) · (yˆS, zˆS) = max
(y,z)∈Y Sh (v)
(qˆ, pˆ) · (y, z) = 0;
(3) for every i ∈ N , (0, xˆi) maximizes ui in the budget set {(0, x) ∈ X i | (qˆ, pˆ) · (0, x) ≤
(qˆ, pˆ) · ωi}; and
(4)
∑
i∈N(0, xˆ
i) =
∑
i∈N ω
i +
∑
S∈N (yˆ
S, zˆS).
The vector (ui(0, xˆi))i∈N = (xˆi)i∈N is called a Walrasian payoff vector of Eh(v). The set
of Walrasian payoff vectors of Eh(v) is denoted by Wh(v).
Condition (2) is the profit maximization condition and it says that the maximum
profit of any coalition is zero. Thus, in condition (3) of the utility maximization, every
agent’s income comes only from his endowment vector. Condition (4) represents the social
feasibility of resources. Note that, by definition, agents can work at several firms in a
Walrasian equilibrium. An equilibrium concept for the situation where every agent is
restricted to work at exactly one firm will be given in Section 5.
Since the first n commodities are agents’ personal commodities in both economies
E1(v) and E2(v), a Walrasian equilibrium for E1(v) and E2(v) has the same problem as
a Lindahl equilibrium for an economy with public goods; every single agent is not small
relative to the size of the market for the corresponding personal commodity and, thus, he
may have an incentive not to act as a price taker.6
The next lemma summarizes the properties of a Walrasian equilibrium for our coalition
production economies E1(v) and E2(v).
Lemma 3. Let v : N → R+ and let ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆS, zˆS)S∈N ) be a Walrasian equi-
librium for E1(v) or E2(v). Then, we have the following properties.
6This problem is not inherent in our representation. The “direct market” of Shapley and Shubik [18]
has also this problem (see Section 4.4).
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(i) pˆ > 0.
(ii) for every i ∈ N , qˆi = pˆxˆi.
(iii) for every S ∈ N , if qˆ(S) = 0, then v(S) = 0.
(iv) for every i ∈ N , if xˆi = 0, then v({i}) = 0.
Proof. Properties (i) and (ii) follow from the utility maximization condition. We prove
property (iii). Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists S ∈ N such that qˆ(S) = 0 and
v(S) > 0. Then, for every λ > 0,
λ(−e(S), v(S)) ∈ Y S2 (v) ⊆ Y S1 (v).
Since (qˆ, pˆ) · (λ(−e(S), v(S))) = λpˆv(S) can be arbitrarily large, we have a contradiction.
Thus, we have obtained property (iii). Property (iv) follows from properties (ii) and
(iii).
This lemma implies the following.
Remark 1. For h ∈ {1, 2} and for a Walrasian payoff vector (xˆi)i∈N ∈ Wh(v), the pair
(((xˆi)i∈N , 1), (0, xˆi)i∈N) of a normalized price vector and a consumption allocation can be
embedded in a Walrasian equilibrium for Eh(v).
Concerning the set of Walrasian payoff vectors, there exists no difference between
economies E1(v) and E2(v).
Theorem 3. Let v : N → R+. Then, W1(v) = W2(v).
This theorem enables us to denote the common set W1(v) = W2(v) by W (v). Theorem
3 will be proved with Theorem 8 in Section 4.5.
4.2 The core
A vector (γS)S∈N such that γS ≥ 0 for every S ∈ N and
∑
S∈N γS e(S) = e(N) is called
a balancing vector of weights. A TU game v : N → R is said to be balanced if for
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every balancing vector (γS)S∈N of weights,
∑
S∈N γS v(S) ≤ v(N) holds. A TU game
v : N → R is said to be totally balanced if every subgame of v is balanced, i.e., for every
S ∈ N and every (γT )T∈N with γT ≥ 0 for every T ∈ N and
∑
T∈N γT e(T ) = e(S),∑
T∈N γT v(T ) ≤ v(S) holds.
Let v : N → R be a TU game. The balanced cover vb of v is a TU game defined by
vb(S) = v(S) if S ∈ N \ {N} and
vb(N) = max
{∑
S∈N
γS v(S)
∣∣∣∣∣ γS ≥ 0 for every S ∈ N and ∑
S∈N
γS e(S) = e(N)
}
.
The totally balanced cover vtb of v is a TU game defined by, for every S ∈ N ,
vtb(S) = max
{∑
T∈N
γT v(T )
∣∣∣∣∣ γT ≥ 0 for every T ∈ N and ∑
T∈N
γT e(T ) = e(S)
}
.
Since the set of balancing vectors of weights is a nonempty compact subset of RN (see
Shapley [17, Lemma 2]), vb(N) is well-defined. Similarly, vtb is well-defined. By definition,
vb(N) = vtb(N) and v ≤ vb ≤ vtb. Note that vb is balanced and vtb is totally balanced.
For a TU game v : N → R, denote the core by C(v), i.e.,
C(v) =
{
x ∈ RN
∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈N
xi ≤ v(N) and
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S) for every S ∈ N
}
.
Bondareva-Shapley theorem (Bondareva [5], Shapley [17]) says a TU game v : N → R is
balanced if and only if C(v) 6= ∅. Thus, v is totally balanced if and only if every subgame
of v has the nonempty core.
The core of the balanced cover coincides with the core of the totally balanced cover.
This fact follows from Shapley and Shubik [18, Lemma 3], but the direct proof is simpler
than their proof.
Lemma 4 (Shapley and Shubik). Let v, w : N → R be such that vb ≤ w ≤ vtb. Then,
C(vb) = C(w) = C(vtb).
Proof. Since vb(N) = vtb(N), we have vb(N) = w(N) = vtb(N). Since vb ≤ w ≤ vtb,
it is clear that C(vtb) ⊆ C(w) ⊆ C(vb). The inclusion C(vb) ⊆ C(vtb) can be shown
straightforwardly.
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4.3 Billera’s (1974) representation of totally balanced TU games
We summarize the TU version of Billera’s [2] representation. Billera [2] characterized
totally balanced NTU games by production economies where every agent has his own
production set. Since the same fact as Lemma 1 holds for such production economies, we
can confine to nonnegative totally balanced TU games.
Let v : N → R+ be totally balanced. Billera’s [2] induced production economy
EB(v) =
(
RN × R, (X i, ui, ωi)i∈N , Z(v)
)
has the same commodity space RN × R and the
same agents’ characteristics (X i, ui, ωi)i∈N as our representations E1(v) and E2(v). The
only difference is in the production set Z(v). The set Z(v) represents the production
set to which every agent can access and Z(v) is given by the convex cone spanned by⋃
S∈N ({−e(S)} × [0, v(S)]).7 Since Z(v) is a convex cone, every coalition’s production
set is also Z(v). Furthermore, since every {−e(S)} × [0, v(S)] is convex, we have
Z(v) =
{∑
S∈N
λS (−e(S), zS) ∈ RN × R
∣∣∣∣∣ λS ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ zS ≤ v(S) for every S ∈ N
}
= co
(⋃
S∈N
Y S2 (v)
)
,
where co(A) stands for the convex hull of set A. Therefore, by decomposing Z(v), we
obtain coalitions’ production sets (Y S2 (v))S∈N in our second representation. It can be
easily shown that EB(v) satisfies all the requirements for a coalition production economy.
Billera’s induced production economy EB(v) can be converted to an exchange economy.
Define a new consumption set Xˆ i by Xˆ i = X i−Z(v) and a new utility function uˆi : Xˆ i →
R by
uˆi(z) = max
{
ui(z + y)
∣∣ y ∈ Z(v) ∩ (X i − {z})} .
This conversion is due to Rader [15] (see also Billera and Bixby [3]). Note that Xˆ i is
nonempty, closed, and convex, but Xˆ i is not bounded from below if v(S) > 0 for some
S ∈ N . We can show that, for every S ∈ N , the set of feasible S-allocations for the
7Strictly speaking, Billera [2] took the convex hull rather than the convex cone. As Billera [2, p.136]
remarked, in his representation, the convex hull can be replaced by the convex cone.
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converted exchange economy is still nonempty and compact.8 Also, we can show that uˆi
is continuous and concave.9
The next theorem is the TU version of Billera [2, Theorem 3.3].
Theorem 4 (Billera). Let v : N → R+ be totally balanced. Then, vEB(v) = v, where vEB(v)
is the TU game generated by economy EB(v).
It is known that the converted exchange economy also generates the given totally
balanced TU game. A Walrasian equilibrium for EB(v) is defined similarly to our induced
coalition production economies.
Definition 2. A tuple ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆ, zˆ)) of a price vector (qˆ, pˆ) ∈ RN × R, agents’
consumption vectors (0, xˆi)i∈N , and production vector (yˆ, zˆ) is a Walrasian equilibrium
for EB(v) if it satisfies conditions (1) and (3) of Definition 1 and
(2′) (yˆ, zˆ) ∈ Z(v) and (qˆ, pˆ) · (yˆ, zˆ) = max(y,z)∈Z(v)(qˆ, pˆ) · (y, z) = 0;
(4′)
∑
i∈N(0, xˆ
i) =
∑
i∈N ω
i + (yˆ, zˆ).
The vector (ui(0, xˆi))i∈N = (xˆi)i∈N is called a Walrasian payoff vector of EB(v). The set
of Walrasian payoff vectors of EB(v) is denoted by WB(v).
Since Z(v) is a convex cone, if (yˆS, zˆS) satisfies condition (2′) for every S ∈ N , then∑
S∈N (yˆ
S, zˆS) also satisfies condition (2′) (see Debreu [6, Theorem (1), p.45]). Thus, for
simplicity, we do not specify coalitions’ optimal production vectors (yˆS, zˆS)S∈N in the
above definition.
The next theorem is the TU version of Qin [13, Theorem 1].
Theorem 5 (Qin). Let v : N → R+ be totally balanced. Then, WB(v) = C(v). Further-
more, for every (xˆi)i∈N ∈ C(v), ((xˆi)i∈N , 1) can be a Walrasian equilibrium price vector
for EB(v).
8The boundedness of the set of feasible S-allocations can be shown by an argument similar to Debreu
[6, Theorem (2), p.77], although every Xˆi is not bounded from below.
9The upper semi-continuity and the concavity can be shown straightforwardly. The lower semi-
continuity of uˆi follows from Rockafellar [16, Theorem 10.2], because Xˆi is a polyhedron, i.e., Xˆi is
the convex hull of a finite set of points and directions.
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As the proof of this theorem is simple, we will give it later together with the proof of
Theorem 8.
4.4 Shapley and Shubik’s (1969) representation of totally bal-
anced TU games
We summarize the representation by Shapley and Shubik [18]. In contrast to our repre-
sentation and Billera’s representation, given a totally balanced TU game, we can directly
obtain the induced exchange economy regardless of whether it is nonnegative or not.
Let v : N → R be totally balanced. The direct market induced by v is an exchange
economy ES(v) =
(
RN , (RN+ , uv, ωi)i∈N
)
such that ωi = e(i) ∈ RN for every i ∈ N and
uv : RN+ → R is given by
uv(x) = max
{∑
S∈N
γS v(S)
∣∣∣∣∣ γS ≥ 0 for every S ∈ N and ∑
S∈N
γS e(S) = x
}
This common utility function among agents is continuous, concave, and homogeneous of
degree one. In contrast to our representation and Billera’s representation, the difference
among TU games is represented by utility function. Since commodity i is initially owned
only by agent i, every commodity is personalized.
Since it is implicitly assumed that there exists one commodity for transferable utility,
the complete form of the utility function is
Uv : RN+ × R→ R, Uv(x, ξ) = uv(x) + ξ,
(see Shapley and Shubik [19, pp.232-233]). Hence, the total number of commodities
required for Shapley and Shubik’s [18] representation is the same as the one required for
our representation and Billera’s representation.
The definition of a Walrasian equilibrium is as follows:10
Definition 3. A pair (p, (zi)i∈N) of a price vector p ∈ RN and an allocation (zi)i∈N is a
Walrasian equilibrium for ES(v) if
10For the derivation of condition (i) from the standard utility maximization condition, again see Shapley
and Shubik [19, pp.232-233].
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(i) for every i ∈ N , zi maximizes z 7→ uv(z)− p · z in RN+ ;
(ii)
∑
i∈N z
i = e(N) =
∑
i∈N ω
i.
A vector (uv(z
i)− p · (zi − ωi))i∈N is called a Walrasian payoff vector of ES(v).11 The set
of Walrasian payoff vectors of ES(v) is denoted by WS(v).
It can be shown that (zi)i∈N is a Walrasian allocation of ES(v), i.e., (p, (zi)i∈N) is
a Walrasian equilibrium for ES(v) for some p ∈ RN if and only if (zi)i∈N maximizes
(yi)i∈N 7→
∑
i∈N uv(y
i) in the set FES(v)(N) of feasible N -allocations of ES(v).
Shapley and Shubik [18, Theorem 5] proved that the induced exchange economy ES(v)
generates the original TU game v if v is totally balanced.
Theorem 6 (Shapley and Shubik). Let v : N → R be totally balanced. Then, vES(v) = v,
where vES(v) is the TU game generated by ES(v).
Shapley and Shubik [19, Theorem 1] proved that, for a totally balanced TU game v,
Walrasian payoff vectors fill up its core. In their representation, any core element has the
relation with a Walrasian equilibrium price vector.
Theorem 7 (Shapley and Shubik). Let v : N → R be totally balanced. Then, WS(v) =
C(v). Furthermore, every (xˆi)i∈N ∈ C(v) can be a Walrasian equilibrium price vector for
ES(v).
4.5 Equivalence between Walrasian payoff vectors and the core
We are now ready to state the main result of Section 4.
Theorem 8. Let v : N → R+. Then,
W (v) = W (vb) = C(vb) = C(vtb) = W (vtb) = WB(v
tb) = WS(v
tb).
Furthermore, by Bondareva-Shapley theorem, the above common set is nonempty.
11The vector (uv(zi)− p · (zi−ωi))i∈N = (Uv(zi,−p · (zi−ωi)))i∈N is an equilibrium utility allocation
when every agent initially has zero amounts of the commodity for transferable utility.
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Even if v(N) < vb(N), agents can produce vb(N) units of the output by working
at each coalition’s firm for the same ratio as the balancing vector of weights generating
vb(N). Thus, although Y Nh (v) ( Y Nh (vb), the first equality W (v) = W (vb) holds. By
applying the same argument to smaller coalitions, we obtain the equality W (v) = W (vtb).
Theorem 8 says this common set W (v) = W (vb) = W (vtb) coincides with the core C(vb)
of the balanced cover. The other equalities C(vb) = C(vtb) = WB(v
tb) = WS(v
tb) are
known results we mentioned earlier (see Lemma 4 and Theorems 5 and 7).
We prove Theorems 3, 5, and 8 simultaneously.
Proof. Let v : N → R+. It is enough to prove the following inclusions:
W2(v) ⊆ W1(v) ⊆ W1(vb) ⊆ C(vb) ⊆ C(vtb) ⊆ WB(vtb) ⊆ W2(v).
Indeed, if we obtain these inclusions, then W1(v) = W2(v), which means that we have
proved Theorem 3. In addition, we have W (v) = W (vb) = C(vb) = C(vtb) = WB(v
tb).
This implies that W (vtb) = C(vtb), because (vtb)b = vtb. The remaining equality C(vtb) =
WS(v
tb) follows from Theorem 7.
Claim 1. W2(v) ⊆ W1(v).
Proof. Let (xˆi)i∈N ∈ W2(v) and let ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆS, zˆS)S∈N ) be a corresponding
Walrasian equilibrium for E2(v). By Lemma 2 (i), it is enough to prove that for every S ∈
N and every (y, z) ∈ Y S1 (v), (qˆ, pˆ) · (y, z) ≤ 0 holds. Let S ∈ N and (y, z) ∈ Y S1 (v). Since
(y, z) ≤ (−minj∈S |yj| e(S), z) ∈ Y S2 (v) by Lemma 2 (ii), from the profit maximization
condition, we have
0 ≥ (qˆ, pˆ) ·
(
−min
j∈S
|yj| e(S), z
)
≥ (qˆ, pˆ) · (y, z).
This completes the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 2. W1(v) ⊆ W1(vb).
Proof. Let (xˆi)i∈N ∈ W1(v) and let ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆS, zˆS)S∈N ) be a corresponding
Walrasian equilibrium for E1(v). Since Y S1 (v) = Y S1 (vb) for every S ∈ N \ {N} and
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Y N1 (v) ⊆ Y N1 (vb), it is enough to prove that for every (y, z) ∈ Y N1 (vb), (qˆ, pˆ) · (y, z) ≤ 0
holds. Let (y, z) ∈ Y N1 (vb). Then, 0 ≤ z ≤ vb(N) minj∈N |yj|. By the definition of
vb, there exists a balancing vector (γS)S∈N of weights such that vb(N) =
∑
S∈N γS v(S).
Then, 0 ≤ z ≤∑S∈N γS v(S) minj∈N |yj|. Hence, there exists (zS)S∈N such that
0 ≤ zS ≤ γS v(S) min
j∈N
|yj| for every S ∈ N and
∑
S∈N
zS = z.
Since (−γS minj∈N |yj| e(S), zS) ∈ Y S2 (v) ⊆ Y S1 (v) for every S ∈ N , we have
0 ≥ (qˆ, pˆ) ·
(
−γS min
j∈N
|yj| e(S), zS
)
for every S ∈ N .
Therefore,
0 ≥ (qˆ, pˆ) ·
(
−min
j∈N
|yj|
∑
S∈N
γS e(S),
∑
S∈N
zS
)
= (qˆ, pˆ) ·
(
−min
j∈N
|yj| e(N), z
)
≥ (qˆ, pˆ) · (y, z).
This completes the proof of Claim 2.
Claim 3. W1(v
b) ⊆ C(vb).
Proof. Let (xˆi)i∈N ∈ W1(vb) and let ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆS, zˆS)S∈N ) be a corresponding
Walrasian equilibrium for E1(vb). By Lemma 2, for every S ∈ N ,
(yˆS, zˆS) ≤
(
−min
j∈S
|yˆS| e(S), zˆS
)
∈ Y S2 (vb) ⊆ Y S1 (vb).
Thus,
e(N) = −
∑
S∈N
yˆS ≥
∑
S∈N
min
j∈S
|yˆSj | e(S).
If the above inequality is strict, (minj∈S |yˆS|)S∈N is not a balancing vector of weights.
Since vb ≥ 0, however, we have∑
S∈N
min
j∈S
|yˆS| vb(S) ≤ vb(N).
Since zˆS ≤ minj∈S |yˆSj | vb(S) for every S ∈ N , we have∑
i∈N
xˆi =
∑
S∈N
zˆS ≤
∑
S∈N
min
j∈S
|yˆSj | vb(S) ≤ vb(N).
20
It remains to prove that for every S ∈ N ,∑i∈S xˆi ≥ vb(S) holds. Suppose, to the contrary,
that there exists S ∈ N with ∑i∈S xˆi < vb(S). Since vb(S) = vE1(vb)(S) by Theorem 1,
there exists (0, xi)i∈S ∈ FE1(vb)(S) with
∑
i∈S x
i = vb(S). From (0, xi)i∈S ∈ FE1(vb)(S),
there exists (y, z) ∈ Y S1 (vb) such that (y, z) =
∑
i∈S((0, x
i) − ωi) = (−e(S),∑i∈S xi).
Since pˆ > 0 and
∑
i∈S xˆ
i < vb(S) =
∑
i∈S x
i = z, we have
0 ≥ (qˆ, pˆ) · (y, z) > (qˆ, pˆ) ·
(
−e(S),
∑
i∈S
xˆi
)
= −
∑
i∈S
qˆi +
∑
i∈S
pˆxˆi =
∑
i∈S
(
pˆxˆi − qˆi
)
= 0,
a contradiction. The last equality follows from Lemma 3 (ii). Hence, for every S ∈ N ,∑
i∈S xˆ
i ≥ vb(S). This completes the proof of Claim 3.
Claim 4. C(vb) ⊆ C(vtb).
This follows from Lemma 4.
Claim 5. C(vtb) ⊆ WB(vtb).
Proof. Let (xˆi)i∈N ∈ C(vtb). Define qˆi = xˆi for every i ∈ N , pˆ = 1, and (yˆ, zˆ) =
(−e(N),∑i∈N xˆi). Since (xˆi)i∈N ∈ C(vtb), we have ∑i∈N xˆi = vtb(N). Thus, (yˆ, zˆ) ∈
Z(vtb). It is clear that conditions (1), (3), and (4′) in Definition 2 are satisfied. Also, we
have
(qˆ, pˆ) · (yˆ, zˆ) = (qˆ, pˆ) ·
(
−e(N),
∑
i∈N
xˆi
)
= −
∑
i∈N
xˆi +
∑
i∈N
xˆi = 0.
It remains to prove that for every (y, z) ∈ Z(vtb), (qˆ, pˆ) · (y, z) ≤ 0 holds. Let (y, z) ∈
Z(vtb). Then, there exist vectors (λS)S∈N and (zS)S∈N such that λS ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ zS ≤
vtb(S) for every S ∈ N , and (y, z) = ∑S∈N λS(−e(S), zS). For every S ∈ N , we have
(qˆ, pˆ) · (−e(S), zS) = −
∑
i∈S
xˆi + zS ≤ −
∑
i∈S
xˆi + vtb(S) ≤ 0.
The last inequality follows from (xˆi)i∈N ∈ C(vtb). Then,
(qˆ, pˆ) · (y, z) =
∑
S∈N
λS(qˆ, pˆ) · (−e(S), zS) ≤ 0.
Therefore, ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆ, zˆ)) is a Walrasian equilibrium for EB(vtb). Thus, (xˆi)i∈N ∈
WB(v
tb). This completes the proof of Claim 5
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Claim 6. WB(v
tb) ⊆ W2(v).
Proof. Let (xˆi)i∈N ∈ WB(vtb) and let ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆ, zˆ)) be a corresponding Wal-
rasian equilibrium for EB(vtb). Since
Z(vtb) 3 (yˆ, zˆ) =
∑
i∈N
(
(0, xˆi)− ωi) = (−e(N),∑
i∈N
xˆi
)
,
there exist vectors (λS)S∈N and (zS)S∈N such that λS ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ zS ≤ vtb(S) for
every S ∈ N , and (−e(N),∑i∈N xˆi) = ∑S∈N λS(−e(S), zS). By the definition of
vtb, for every S ∈ N , there exists (γS,T )T∈N such that γS,T ≥ 0 for every T ∈ N ,∑
T∈N γS,T e(T ) = e(S), and v
tb(S) =
∑
T∈N γS,T v(T ). For every S ∈ N , since 0 ≤ zS ≤
vtb(S) =
∑
T∈N γS,T v(T ), there exists (z
S,T )T∈N such that 0 ≤ zS,T ≤ v(T ) for every
T ∈ N and zS = ∑T∈N γS,T zS,T . Then, for every S ∈ N ,
(−e(S), zS) =
(
−
∑
T∈N
γS,T e(T ),
∑
T∈N
γS,T z
S,T
)
=
∑
T∈N
γS,T (−e(T ), zS,T ).
Note that for every S, T ∈ N , (−e(T ), zS,T ) ∈ Y T2 (v). Then,
(yˆ, zˆ) =
∑
S∈N
λS(−e(S), zS) =
∑
S∈N
λS
∑
T∈N
γS,T (−e(T ), zS,T )
=
∑
T∈N
(∑
S∈N
λS γS,T (−e(T ), zS,T )
)
.
For every T ∈ N , define
(yˆT , zˆT ) =
∑
S∈N
λS γS,T (−e(T ), zS,T ).
Then, (yˆ, zˆ) =
∑
T∈N (yˆ
T , zˆT ) and (yˆT , zˆT ) ∈ Y T2 (v), because Y T2 (v) is a convex cone.
Since Y T2 (v) ⊆ Z(v) ⊆ Z(vtb), we have (qˆ, pˆ) · (yˆT , zˆT ) ≤ 0 for every T ∈ N . Since
0 = (qˆ, pˆ) · (yˆ, zˆ) =
∑
T∈N
(qˆ, pˆ) · (yˆT , zˆT ),
we have (qˆ, pˆ) · (yˆT , zˆT ) = 0 for every T ∈ N .
Let T ∈ N and (y, z) ∈ Y T2 (v). Again, since Y T2 (v) ⊆ Z(v) ⊆ Z(vtb), we have
(qˆ, pˆ) · (y, z) ≤ 0.
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Hence, ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆT , zˆT )T∈N ) is a Walrasian equilibrium for E2(v). Thus,
(xˆi)i∈N ∈ W2(v). This completes the proof of Claim 6.
From Claims 1-6, we have proved Theorems 3, 5, and 8.
From the proof above, we have the following.
Remark 2. A payoff vector (xˆi)i∈N ∈ C(vb) = C(vtb) can be a Walrasian equilibrium
input price vector for economies E1(v), E2(v), and EB(v).
5 Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing
In the previous section, agents are allowed to work at several firms. Here, we bring the
indivisibility restriction of no-double-jobbing into the model.
5.1 Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing and the coali-
tion structure
We first give the precise definition of a Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing for
our induced coalition production economies.
Definition 4. A tuple ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆS, zˆS)S∈N ) is a Walrasian equilibrium without
double-jobbing for Eh(v) (h = 1 or 2) if it is a Walrasian equilibrium for Eh(v) and it also
satisfies
(5) for every i ∈ N , there exists a unique S ∈ N such that i ∈ S, yˆSi = −1, and yˆTi = 0
for every T 6= S.
The vector (ui(0, xˆi))i∈N = (xˆi)i∈N is called a Walrasian payoff vector without double-
jobbing of Eh(v). The set of Walrasian payoff vectors without double-jobbing of Eh(v) is
denoted by W ∗h (v).
In this definition, condition (5) can be replaced by
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(5′) for every S ∈ N , yˆS ∈ {−1, 0}N .
It is clear that condition (5) implies condition (5′). Conversely, condition (5′) together
with conditions (2) and (4) in Definition 1 implies condition (5). Note that, by definition,
W ∗h (v) ⊆ Wh(v) for h = 1, 2.
This notion of Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing was considered by Sun
et al. [20] in order to discuss the endogenous coalition formation of a core element. If
a TU game v : N → R+ is balanced, by Theorem 8, its core coincides with the set
of Walrasian payoff vectors. In a Walrasian equilibrium, however, agents may invest
their labor fractionally in any coalition’s production plan. Thus, we cannot discuss which
coalitions are formed in an equilibrium. The no-double-jobbing condition (5) requires that
any agent can contribute only one firm. If all agents in coalition S work at firm S, we can
interpreted that coalition S is formed endogenously in an equilibrium. Consequently, we
can discuss which coalitions are formed in a core element by considering the corresponding
Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing.
Let ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆS, zˆS)S∈N ) be a Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing
for Eh(v). The coalition structure in the equilibrium is the set of coalitions actually formed
in the equilibrium. Thus, {S ∈ N | yˆSi = −1 for every i ∈ S} is the coalition structure.
By no-double-jobbing condition (5), any two distinct coalitions in the coalition structure
are disjoint.
There exists a difference in the coalition structure between our induced economies
E1(v) and E2(v). The coalition structure of E2(v) is always a partition of N , but the
coalition structure of E1(v) need not be a partition.
Proposition 1. The coalition structure in a Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing
for E2(v) is a partition of N .
Proof. Let ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆS, zˆS)S∈N ) be a Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing
for E2(v) and let B = {S ∈ N | yˆSi = −1 for every i ∈ S} be the associated coalition struc-
ture. Since any elements in B are disjoint by no-double-jobbing condition, it is enough to
prove that N ⊆ ⋃S∈B S. Let i ∈ N . Then, by no-double-jobbing condition, there exists a
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unique S ∈ N such that i ∈ S, yˆSi = −1, and yˆTi = 0 for every T 6= S. By the definition
of Y S2 (v), we have yˆ
S
j = −1 for every j ∈ S and, therefore, S ∈ B. Hence, B is a partition
of N .
The next proposition says that in a Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing for
E1(v), if coalition S contains an agent who works at firm S and whose Walrasian payoff
is strictly positive, then the coalition S is actually formed.
Proposition 2. Let ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆS, zˆS)S∈N ) be a Walrasian equilibrium without
double-jobbing for E1(v). If xˆi > 0 and yˆSi = −1 for some i ∈ S, then coalition S is
formed, i.e., yˆSj = −1 for every j ∈ S. Therefore,
N \ {i ∈ N | xˆi = 0} ⊆
⋃
S∈B
S,
where B = {S ∈ N | yˆSi = −1 for every i ∈ S} is the coalition structure in the equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists a coalition S ∈ N and agents i, j ∈ S
such that xˆi > 0, yˆSi = −1, and yˆSj = 0. From (yˆS, zˆS) ∈ Y S1 (v), it follows that 0 ≤ zˆS ≤
v(S) mink∈S |yˆSk | = 0. Then, from the profit maximization condition, we have
0 = (qˆ, pˆ) · (yˆS, zˆS) = qˆ · yˆS + pˆzˆS = qˆ · yˆS.
Since qˆ ≥ 0 and yˆS ≤ 0, we have qˆkyˆSk = 0 for every k ∈ S. Thus, by Lemma 3 (ii) and
(i), we have
0 = qˆiyˆ
S
i = −qˆi = −pˆxˆi < 0,
a contradiction.
This proposition implies that if a Walrasian payoff vector without double-jobbing of
E1(v) is strictly positive, then the corresponding coalition structure is a partition of N .
If agent i’s Walrasian payoff without double-jobbing is zero, however, it is indifferent for
agent i between working at firm {i} and working at an inactive firm S with yˆSj = 0 for some
j ∈ S \{i}. When agent i works at firm {i}, the maximum output from the production is
zero, because v({i}) = 0 by Lemma 3 (iv). When agent i works at firm S with yˆSj = 0 for
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some j ∈ S \ {i}, the maximum output is also zero, because v(S) mink∈S |yˆSk | = 0. In the
latter case, the associated coalition structure is not a partition.12 The following example
illustrates this point.
Example 1. Let N = {1, 2} and let v be such that v({1}) = 1, v({2}) = 0, and
v({1, 2}) = 1. Let qˆ = (1, 0), pˆ = 1, xˆ1 = 1, and xˆ2 = 0.13 Then, there exist three
possibilities of production vectors with which ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N) is a Walrasian equilibrium
without double-jobbing for E1(v).
case 1 case 2 case 3
(yˆ
{1}
1 , yˆ
{1}
2 , zˆ
{1}) (-1,0,1) (0,0,0) (-1,0,1)
(yˆ
{2}
1 , yˆ
{2}
2 , zˆ
{2}) (0,-1,0) (0,0,0) (0,0,0)
(yˆ
{1,2}
1 , yˆ
{1,2}
2 , zˆ
{1,2}) (0,0,0) (-1,-1,1) (0,-1,0)
In cases 1 and 2, the associated coalition structure is a partition of {1, 2}. In case 3,
however, the coalition structure is {{1}}, which is not a partition of {1, 2}.
Notice that the coalition structure in a Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing
for E1(v) need not be a partition as in case 3, but there exists a coalition structure of the
form of a partition as in cases 1 and 2. This fact holds in general.14
The next theorem says that the sets W ∗1 (v) and W
∗
2 (v) of Walrasian payoff vectors
without double-jobbing for E1(v) and E2(v) are the same.
Theorem 9. Let v : N → R+. Then, W ∗1 (v) = W ∗2 (v).
This theorem enables us to denote the common set W ∗1 (v) = W
∗
2 (v) by W
∗(v). Theo-
rem 9 will be proved with Theorem 10 in Section 5.3.
12This point was missed by Sun et al. [20].
13Note that (xˆ1, xˆ2) = (1, 0) is a core element of v. By an argument similar to the proof of Claim 4 of
Theorem 10, the pair (((xˆ1, xˆ2), 1), ((0, xˆ1), (0, xˆ2))) of a price vector and a consumption allocation can
be embedded in a Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing. Recall Remark 2.
14By an argument similar to the proof of Theorem 10, we can prove that if ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N )
is the pair of a price vector and a consumption allocation of a Walrasian equilibrium with-
out double-jobbing for E1(v), then there exist coalitions’ production vectors (yˆS , zˆS)S∈N such that
((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆS , zˆS)S∈N ) is a Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing for E2(v). Then, by
virtue of Proposition 1, the resulting coalition structure is a partition of N .
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5.2 Cohesive cover, completion, and superadditive cover of TU
games
Let v : N → R. The cohesive cover or the completion vc of v is a TU game defined by
vc(S) = v(S) if S ∈ N \ {N} and
vc(N) = max
{
k∑
j=1
v(Sj)
∣∣∣∣∣ {S1, . . . , Sk} is a partition of N
}
.
The term “cohesive” is due to Osborne and Rubinstein [12] and the term “completion” is
due to Sun et al. [20].
In the standard definition of the core, the feasibility with respect to the grand coalition
N is required (see Section 4.2). If for a TU game v : N → R and x ∈ RN , v(N) <∑
i∈N xi ≤
∑k
j=1 v(Sj) holds for some partition {S1, . . . , Sk} of N , payoff vector x is
not feasible with respect to the grand coalition but it can be achieved, provided that
agents form the coalitions S1, . . . , Sk. In the core of the completion v
c, payoff vectors
achievable by disjoint coalitions of N are regarded as possible payoff vectors. Accordingly,
the feasibility with respect to the grand coalition N is distinguished from the possibility
of payoff vectors.15
The superadditive cover vsa of v is a TU game defined by, for every S ∈ N ,
vsa(S) = max
{
k∑
j=1
v(Tj)
∣∣∣∣∣ {T1, . . . , Tk} is a partition of S
}
.
By definition, vc(N) = vsa(N) and v ≤ vc ≤ vsa. The core of the completion coincides
with the core of the superadditive cover. This fact is due to Guesnerie and Oddou [9,
Lemma 1].
Lemma 5 (Guesnerie and Oddou). Let v, w : N → R be such that vc ≤ w ≤ vsa. Then,
C(vc) = C(w) = C(vsa).
This can be shown straightforwardly.
15This kind of distinction was made in the early period of the research of the core by Gillies [8]. Boehm
[4], Guesnerie and Oddou [9], and Sun et al. [20] emphasize this distinction.
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5.3 Equivalence between Walrasian payoff vectors without double-
jobbing and the core
We are now ready to state the main result of Section 5. The next theorem is an extension
of Sun et al. [20, Theorem 3.2] that proved the equality W ∗1 (v
c) = C(vc) for every
v : N → R+.16
Theorem 10. Let v : N → R+. Then, W ∗(v) = W ∗(vc) = C(vc) = C(vsa) = W ∗(vsa).
Concerning the equalities W ∗(v) = W ∗(vc) = W ∗(vsa), we can give the intuition
similar to the equalities W (v) = W (vb) = W (vtb) in Theorem 8. In the case where
v(N) < vc(N), agents can earn vc(N) units of the output by working at disjoint smaller
coalitions’ firms. Thus, although Y Nh (v) ( Y Nh (vc), the equality W ∗(v) = W ∗(vc) holds.
By applying the same argument to smaller coalitions, we have the equality W ∗(v) =
W ∗(vsa).
We simultaneously prove Theorems 9 and 10. The proof is similar to the proof of
Theorems 3 and 8. Its idea originates from the proof of Theorem 3.2 of Sun et al. [20],
but we need a modification because the coalition structure in an equilibrium for E1(v)
need not be a partition.
Proof. Let v : N → R+. It is enough to prove the following inclusions:
W ∗2 (v) ⊆ W ∗1 (v) ⊆ W ∗1 (vc) ⊆ C(vc) ⊆ W ∗2 (v).
Indeed, if we obtain these inclusions, we have W ∗(v) = W ∗(vc) = C(vc) for every v : N →
R+. Since (vsa)c = vsa, these equalities imply W ∗(vsa) = C(vsa). The remaining equality
C(vc) = C(vsa) follows from Lemma 5.
Claim 1. W ∗2 (v) ⊆ W ∗1 (v).
Proof. Let (xˆi)i∈N ∈ W ∗2 (v) and let ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆS, zˆS)S∈N ) be a corresponding
Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing for E2(v). Since Y S2 (v) ⊆ Y S1 (v) for every
16From the proof of Theorem 3.2 of Sun et al. [20], as far as the equality W ∗1 (v
c) = C(vc) is concerned,
their assumption of the balancedness of vc is dispensable.
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S ∈ N by Lemma 2 (i), it suffices to prove that for every S ∈ N and every (y, z) ∈ Y S1 (v),
(qˆ, pˆ) · (y, z) ≤ 0. Let S ∈ N and (y, z) ∈ Y S1 (v). Then, by Lemma 2 (ii),
(y, z) ≤
(
−min
j∈S
|yj| e(S), z
)
∈ Y S2 (v)
and, therefore, we have
(qˆ, pˆ) · (y, z) ≤ (qˆ, pˆ) ·
(
−min
j∈S
|yj| e(S), z
)
≤ 0.
This completes the proof of Claim 1.
Claim 2. W ∗1 (v) ⊆ W ∗1 (vc).
Proof. Let (xˆi)i∈N ∈ W ∗1 (v) and let ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆS, zˆS)S∈N ) be a corresponding
Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing for E1(v). Since v(N) ≤ vc(N), from
(yˆN , zˆN) ∈ Y N1 (v), it follows that (yˆN , zˆN) ∈ Y N1 (vc). It remains to prove that for every
(y, z) ∈ Y N1 (vc), (qˆ, pˆ) ·(y, z) ≤ 0 holds. Let (y, z) ∈ Y N1 (vc). By the definition of vc, there
exists a partition pi ofN with vc(N) =
∑
S∈pi v(S). Since (y, z) ≤ (−minj∈N |yj| e(N), z) ∈
Y N2 (v
c) by Lemma 2 (ii), we have
0 ≤ z ≤ vc(N) min
j∈N
|yj| =
∑
S∈pi
min
j∈N
|yj| v(S).
Thus, there exists (zS)S∈pi such that
0 ≤ zS ≤ min
j∈N
|yj| v(S) for every S ∈ pi and
∑
S∈pi
zS = z.
Since
(−minj∈N |yj| e(S), zS) ∈ Y S2 (v) ⊆ Y S1 (v), we have
(qˆ, pˆ) ·
(
−min
j∈N
|yj| e(S), zS
)
≤ 0 for every S ∈ pi.
Hence,
(qˆ, pˆ) · (y, z) ≤ (qˆ, pˆ) ·
(
−min
j∈N
|yj| e(N), z
)
=
∑
S∈pi
(qˆ, pˆ) ·
(
−min
j∈N
|yj| e(S), zS
)
≤ 0.
This completes the proof of Claim 2.
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Claim 3. W ∗1 (v
c) ⊆ C(vc).
Proof. Let (xˆi)i∈N ∈ W ∗1 (vc) and let ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆS, zˆS)S∈N ) be a corresponding
Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing for E1(vc). Let B = {S ∈ N | yˆSi =
−1 for every i ∈ S} be the coalition structure and let S0 = N \
⋃
S∈B S. Then, by no-
double-jobbing condition, B ∪ {S0} is a partition of N and, by Proposition 2, xˆi = 0
for every i ∈ S0. Note that for every S ∈ N \ B, there exists i ∈ S with yˆSi = 0.
Thus, for every S ∈ N \ B, zˆS = 0 holds. In particular, zˆS0 = 0 ≤ vc(S0). Since
(yˆS, zˆS) = (−e(S), zˆS) ∈ Y S1 (vc) for every S ∈ B, we have zˆS ≤ vc(S) for every S ∈ B.
Then, ∑
i∈N
xˆi =
∑
S∈N
zˆS =
∑
S∈B∪{S0}
zˆS ≤
∑
S∈B∪{S0}
vc(S) ≤ vc(N).
Let S ∈ N . Since (−e(S), v(S)) ∈ Y S1 (vc), from the profit maximization condition
and Lemma 3 (ii), we have
0 ≥ (qˆ, pˆ) · (−e(S), v(S)) = −
∑
i∈S
qˆi + pˆv(S) = pˆ
(
−
∑
i∈S
xˆi + v(S)
)
.
Since pˆ > 0 by Lemma 3 (i), we have
∑
i∈S xˆ
i ≥ v(S) for every S ∈ N . Hence,∑
i∈S
xˆi ≥ v(S) = vc(S) for every S ∈ N \ {N}.
By the definition of vc, there exists a partition pi of N with vc(N) =
∑
S∈pi v(S). Since∑
i∈S xˆ
i ≥ v(S) for every S ∈ pi, we have∑
i∈N
xˆi =
∑
S∈pi
∑
i∈S
xˆi ≥
∑
S∈pi
v(S) = vc(N).
Thus, (xˆi)i∈N ∈ C(vc) and, therefore, we have proved Claim 3.
Claim 4. C(vc) ⊆ W ∗2 (v).
Proof. Let (xˆi)i∈N ∈ C(vc). By the definition of vc, there exists a partition pi of N with
vc(N) =
∑
S∈pi v(S). Define pˆ = 1, qˆi = xˆ
i for every i ∈ N , (yˆS, zˆS) = (−e(S), v(S)) if
S ∈ pi, and (yˆS, zˆS) = (0, 0) if S ∈ N \ pi. We prove that ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆS, zˆS)S∈N )
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is a Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing for E2(v). The nonnegativity of price
vector, the utility maximization, and the no-double-jobbing are all satisfied. Since∑
S∈N
(yˆS, zˆS) =
∑
S∈pi
(yˆS, zˆS) =
∑
S∈pi
(−e(S), v(S)) =
(
−e(N),
∑
S∈pi
v(S)
)
=
∑
i∈N
(0, xˆi)−
∑
i∈N
ωi,
we have the feasibility. The last equality follows from
∑
i∈N xˆ
i = vc(N) =
∑
S∈pi v(S),
because (xˆi)i∈N ∈ C(vc).
It is clear that for every S ∈ N , (yˆS, zˆS) ∈ Y S2 (v). Let S ∈ pi. Then,
(qˆ, pˆ) · (yˆS, zˆS) = (qˆ, pˆ) · (−e(S), v(S)) = −
∑
i∈S
qˆi + v(S) = −
∑
i∈S
xˆi + v(S)
≤ −
∑
i∈S
xˆi + vc(S) ≤ 0.
Since ∑
S∈pi
(qˆ, pˆ) · (yˆS, zˆS) = (qˆ, pˆ) · (−e(N), vc(N)) = −
∑
i∈N
qˆi + v
c(N)
= −
∑
i∈N
xˆi + vc(N) = 0,
we have
(qˆ, pˆ) · (yˆS, zˆS) = 0 for every S ∈ pi.
It is clear that for every S ∈ N \ pi, (qˆ, pˆ) · (yˆS, zˆS) = 0 holds.
It remains to prove that for every S ∈ N and every (y, z) ∈ Y S2 (v), (qˆ, pˆ) · (y, z) ≤ 0.
Let S ∈ N and (y, z) ∈ Y S2 (v). Then, there exists λ ≥ 0 with y = −λe(S). Then, from
(y, z) = (−λe(S), z) ∈ Y S2 (v), it follows that z ≤ λv(S). Hence,
(qˆ, pˆ) · (y, z) ≤ (qˆ, pˆ) · (−λe(S), λv(S)) = λ
(
−
∑
i∈S
qˆi + v(S)
)
≤ λ
(
−
∑
i∈S
xˆi + vc(S)
)
≤ 0.
The last inequality follows from (xˆi)i∈N ∈ C(vc). Thus, ((qˆ, pˆ), (0, xˆi)i∈N , (yˆS, zˆS)S∈N ) is
a Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing for E2(v). This completes the proof of
Claim 4.
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From Claims 1-4, we have proved Theorems 9 and 10.
If the completion of a TU game is balanced, there exists no difference between Wal-
rasian payoff vector and Walrasian payoff vector without double-jobbing.
Theorem 11. Let v : N → R+.
(i) If vc is balanced, then vc = vb and
W ∗(v) = W ∗(vc) = W ∗(vsa) = W ∗(vtb)
= C(vc) = C(vsa) = C(vtb)
= W (v) = W (vc) = W (vsa) = W (vtb) = WB(v
tb) = WS(v
tb) 6= ∅.
(ii) If W ∗(v) 6= ∅, then vc is balanced.
Proof. We first prove (i). Let v : N → R+ be such that vc is balanced. Then, vc(N) =
vb(N) and, therefore, vc = vb. By Theorem 8, we have
W (v) = W (vc) = C(vc) = C(vtb) = W (vtb) = WB(v
tb) = WS(v
tb) 6= ∅.
Since (vsa)b = vsa, we have W (vsa) = C(vsa). By Theorem 10, we have
W ∗(v) = W ∗(vc) = C(vc) = C(vsa) = W ∗(vsa).
Since (vtb)c = vtb, we have W ∗(vtb) = C(vtb). Thus, we have proved (i).
Statement (ii) immediately follows from Theorem 10 and Bondareva-Shapley theorem.
6 Concluding remarks
First, we proved that every TU game can be generated by a coalition production economy
(Theorem 2). Second, we clarify the relationship between the core of a given TU game
and the set of Walrasian payoff vectors of our induced coalition production economies
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(Theorem 8). Third, we consider a Walrasian equilibrium without double-jobbing and
extend the theorem by Sun et al. [20] (Theorems 10 and 11).
Our second induced economy E2(v) has the connection with Billera’s [2] induced pro-
duction economy. Billera [2] gave a representation theorem on NTU games. By the same
idea as the present paper, we can prove that every compactly generated NTU game can
be generated by a coalition production economy without transferable utility (see Inoue
[10]). Furthermore, we can prove that for every compactly generated NTU game, the
inner core of its balanced cover coincides with the set of Walrasian payoff vectors of the
NTU representation (see Inoue [10]), which is also equal to the set of Walrasian payoff
vectors of Billera’s [2] NTU representation of the totally balanced cover (see Qin [13]).
This common set is, however, possibly empty, because the balancedness is not sufficient
for the nonemptiness of the inner core. Qin [14] and Inoue [11] give sufficient conditions
for the nonemptiness of the inner core.
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